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Domestic Violence and Labor Market Outcomes: 
Evidence from a Mixed-Race Developing Country
* 
 
This study investigates the heterogeneous effects of domestic violence over labor markets in 
an ethnically fragmented country such as Bolivia. Among developing countries, Bolivia 
“excels” in having one of the highest levels of domestic violence in the region. Anecdotal 
evidence and empirical evidence suggest that response to domestic violence is not 
homogeneous across different ethnic groups. Using information from the Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS) for Bolivia, we examine the heterogeneous impacts of domestic 
violence over one of the key labor market outcomes such as employment. We employ a 
probabilistic decision model and treatment regression techniques to examine this effect. We 
claim that the impact of domestic violence on labor markets is limited among indigenous 
people, given that violence is, to some extent, socially recognized and accepted. We find that 
for most of the cases, indigenous women are less responsive to domestic violence than non-
indigenous ones, except for groups with a high income level. Our results are robust for 
alternative methodologies to address possible endogeneity problems. 
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1.  Introduction 
Intra-household violence is a very important topic that has been mainly studied by sociologists and 
criminalists. Its importance has been recognized for being associated with serious problems for 
public health, human rights and welfare. Women and children are the principal victims, especially in 
developing countries (WHO 2002). Bolivia "excels" for having high levels of domestic violence,
2 
which is particularly an issue in an indigenous population who considers it as a minor problem. 
Despite the anecdotal evidence, very little attention was focused on analyzing the effects of violence 
on topics beyond  the physical and psychological safety of women in developing countries. More 
specifically, literature on the relationship s between violence and labor market outcomes, such as 
wages, labor force participation, and productivity is relatively scarce.
3  
The  dichotomy  of  the  violence-labor  relationship  is  indeed  very  important  in  Bolivia,  not  only 
because  of  the  high  levels  of  domestic  violence  but  also  because  of  the  different  perceptions 
between  indigenous  and  non-indigenous  populations  in  urban  and  rural  areas.  Anthropological 
studies,  such  as  Albo  (1994),  argue  that  intra-household  violence  is,  to  some  extent,  socially 
recognized and accepted among indigenous populations, who could be  influenced by the so-called 
―communitarian justice‖, while non-indigenous people have no particular favoritism in respect to 
violence. 
This law for the Bolivian indigenous population is often based on rules and customs that tolerate, 
under certain circumstances, husbands beating their wives
4. Even though the current law in the 
                                                            
2 For instance, 83% of children are victims of domestic violence at some degree (INE-UNICEF 2007), while the 
incidence of violence between parents is about 53% (UDAPE-UNICEF 2008a). Also, according to the Demographic 
Health  Survey  2003  report  for  Bolivia,  at  least  54%  of  women  declared  to  have  been  victims  to  some  kind  of 
psychological violence, while 53% declared to be victim of physical violence. 
3 Moreover, the existing theory is ambiguous at defining the relationship and direction of causality between labor market 
outcomes and violence. Some authors such as Molm (1997) agree that violence is a consequence of men losing their role 
in households, while others argue (Kalmuss and Straus, 1990) that work help to alleviate and reduce the incidence of 
violence through bargaining, while the last ones, that work is an escape from violent households. 
4 According to Machicado (2010), all the activities classified as intra household conflicts and domestic violence are 
considered only as minor problem, and are punished only with communitarian justice. 2 
 
country  establishes  the  penalties  for  intra-household  violence,  with  an  important  institutional 
response  from  the  public  sector  preventing  and  fighting  domestic  violence  (UDAPE-UNICEF 
2008b), there are some segments of the population where the law of the land does not hold, leading 
to  the  reign  of  ―communitarian  justice‖
5.  Moreover,  in  the  last  modification  of  the  political 
constitution of Bolivia, the communitarian justice is actually recognized and accepted as part of the 
legal system. 
Under  these  considerations,  in  this  paper  we  examine  the  impact  of  domestic  violence  inside 
marriage  in  a  mixed-race  country,  such  as  Bolivia,  focusing  on  the  potential  differential  effect 
between  indigenous  and  non-indigenous  couples.  The  hypothesis  behind  the  analysis  is  that 
indigenous  people  might  be  less  sensitive  to  husband-wife  violence,  compared  to  their  non-
indigenous counterparts, when deciding whether or not to participate in the labor market, because 
they consider domestic violence as a "normal" behavior from their partners. 
Using a probit model we estimate how violence relates to the decisions of exiting the labor market 
after considering all other factors that generally affect female labor market participation. Given the 
potential endogeneity problem, we applied a probit instrumental variable approach using the average 
incidence of domestic violence in the region as an instrument that is clearly related to the higher risk 
of domestic violence but would not affect the probability of leaving a job. In addition, we also use a 
treatment selection model, using factors such as intergenerational violence and acceptance as an 
exclusion restriction, in order to address the endogeneity problem. Our results are consistent with 
the intuition of heterogeneous effects of violence on indigenous vs. non-indigenous women. Even 
though we find a significant effect of violence on exiting jobs, we also find that indigenous women 
are less responsive to domestic violence when compared to their non-indigenous peers. In addition, 
                                                            
5 ―The Communitarian justice is an Institution of Consuetudinary Rights that allows to penalize punishable acts of 
individuals without intervention of the State, Judges or its bureaucracy, but directly by the community of individuals and 
their chosen authorities‖. (Machicado, 2010) It implies the recognition of the traditional juridical practices of indigenous 
people in Bolivia. 3 
 
we  confirm  the  hypothesis  that  the  effects  differ  inside  each  group  depending  on  the  income 
position (a proxy for social status) of the women.  
The rest of  the paper  is organized as follows. Section  2  presents a review of  the literature on 
domestic violence. Section 3 presents the descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes the analytical 
framework and methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and section 6 concludes. 
2.  Where do we stand? A brief review of the literature 
Domestic violence is a complex problem that has a negative impact on household welfare, especially 
on the direct victims. Although these effects can be evident in different aspects, one of the most 
important aspects examined in the economic literature has been the impact of domestic violence on 
labor market outcomes, such as productivity and employment. One of the gaps in this literature, 
however, is that they do not consider heterogeneous impacts (i.e. between ethnic groups), which 
could affect how victims are influenced by domestic violence, as it is the case between indigenous 
and non-indigenous people in Bolivia.  
The  literature  on  domestic  violence  and  labor  force  participation  has  mainly  examined  their 
relationships using two different approaches. One strand of the literature considers employment and 
the generation of income as the triggering factor affecting domestic violence. A second strand of the 
literature analyzes how domestic violence affects the performance and participation of the victims in 
the labor market.  
In the group of the first approach, authors such as Aizer(2007), Gelles(1976), Bhattacharya et al 
(2009), Bowlus and Seitz (2006), Macmillian and Gartner (1999), Tauchen et al (1991) and Farmer 
and Tauchen, and Witte (1995) explain that the decisions of participating in the labor market and 
generating resources are the ones that affect the incidence of domestic violence in the household. 
The way domestic violence is affected depends on how the bargaining power and the roles of the 
household members affect the potential victim‘s decisions. On the one hand, when the wife earns 4 
 
resources, she has more decision power in the household and becomes more independent, which 
gives her a better position when avoiding violent situations (Kalmuss and Straus 1990). On the other 
hand, because the wife is gaining this power, the husband might feel that his position is threatened, 
and he might use coercion (violence) to regain his position (Molm, 1997). 
In this sense, most of the authors find that women with more resources and wealth are less likely to 
remain in an abusive relationship or present relatively lower rates of domestic violence. Therefore 
the high correlation that exists between social status, income, and violence is of importance in the 
analysis. Furthermore, Macmillan and Gartner (1999) and Aizer (2007) also find that the potential 
employment status can work as a signal for reducing the incidence of domestic violence. Macmillan 
and Gartner (1999) also find that the labor force participation can reduce the risk of violence if the 
husband also works, but could increase it if he is unemployed.  
 Some authors, such as Tauchen et al (1991) and Farmer, Tauchen, and Witte (1995), have found no 
evidence that employment status has any effect on domestic violence. According to this side of the 
literature, changes on the incidence of domestic violence are triggered by changes in the situations of 
the household members, in particular of the victims (wives). This analysis implies that the later are 
exogenous  shocks.  However,  as  the  second  strand  of  the  literature  emphasizes,  labor  market 
decisions can also be affected by the incidences of domestic violence. This situation complicates the 
analysis, since both variables might be defining each other simultaneously, and the net effect of the 
violence would be more difficult to identify. 
In the second approach of analysis, many authors (Franzway, 1998; Lloyd, 1997; Lloyd and Taluc, 
1999;  Meisel,  Chandler  and  Reinzi,  2003;  Swanberg  and  Logan,  2005;  Seitz,  1998;  Tolman  and 
Wang,  2005)  focus  on  analyzing  of  the  effects  of  domestic  violence  on  the  performance, 
productivity, and work-related decisions of the victims. According to this approach, violence might 
affect  labor  decisions  in  two  possible  ways.  First,  the  perpetrator  can  interfere  on  the  normal 5 
 
activities of the victim using coercion, interrupting her, harassing her, or even beating her. These 
activities  might  reduce  the  victim's  work  performance,  reduce  her  attendance,  or  increase  the 
subjective costs of hiring her, which could directly translate into fewer hours at work or even job 
termination. Second, women who suffer from domestic violence are more actively trying to get away 
from  home,  and  going  out  to  work  is  an  alternative.  Although  this  channel  might  initially  be 
reflected  in  higher  levels  of  labor  force  participation,  with  its  combination  with  the  previous 
channel, it could be translated to higher levels of job instability and job termination rates. 
 Considering this approach, the evidence in the literature shows that domestic violence is negatively 
correlated with earnings and positively related with job  exit.  Women who suffer from violence 
present higher rates of unemployment in the past (Lloyd, 1997; Lloyd and Taluc, 1999). Women 
who are victims of domestic violence present lower rates of employment or work for fewer hours 
(Meisel, Chandler and Reinzi, 2003; Swanberg and Logan, 2005; Tolman and Wang, 2005). 
Despite the problematic situation of domestic violence in Bolivia, to the best of our knowledge, it 
has  been  almost  nonexistent  previous  research.  The  only  study  that  identifies  the  problem  of 
domestic  violence,  with  emphasis  on  children‘s  welfare,  are  the  studies  by  UDAPE-UNICEF 
(2008a)  and  INE-UNICEF  (2007),  which  quantify  and  analyze  the  determinants  of  domestic 
violence against children and the institutional response from the public sector for the prevention of 
domestic violence. 
3.  Data and statistics 
3.1 Data 
 
For the purpose of this paper, we use information from the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) of 
2003 for Bolivia
6. This is a national representative survey which focuses on health outcomes for 
women and children, but also contains basic demographic and socioeconomic information for all 
                                                            
6 Encuesta Nacional de Demografia y Salud (ENDSA) 2003 in Spanish 6 
 
the  household  members.  The  main  advantage  of  using  this  survey  is  that  it  provides  detailed 
information on the victims and victimizers of domestic violence, and allows us to focus our analysis 
on the incidences of domestic violence between husbands and their partners (wives). Although 
information in respect to violence against husbands is also available, we exclude it from this analysis. 
Detailed information on violence is only available for a specific group of women in the sample, 
namely a female population who all are married and/or living  as a couple. The survey collects 
information from 17,654 eligible women, all between 15 to 49 years old.    
 From the entire sample, we extracted a subsample of 7.842 women aged 15 years old or older who 
worked during the year and declared being in a committed relationship (married or living in union 
with someone). Hereafter, the analysis is constrained to this subsample of women.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
According to our estimations, 64.19% of women in the sample were living in urban areas. These 
women are characterized as being relatively young (33.69 yrs) and with low levels of education (7.21 
yrs). Using self-reported information on language spoken during childhood, 39.82% of women are 
classified indigenous.7 Considering the characteristics of their households, 79.70% of the women 
declared to have children living in the households, while 53.15% stated they have children under the 
age of 5. With respect to the labor market status,  considering that all women in the sample were 
working at some point during the year,8 88.80% were currently working at time of the interview.  
Considering the  information across indigenous and non -indigenous people, some characteristics 
vary substantially. Indigenous women have much lower education (4.15 yrs) compared to non -
indigenous people (9.23 yrs). Indigenous women are also more likely to live in household s with 
                                                            
7 Even the empirical definition of indigenous population is not clearly established most of the literature follows two 
identification strategies for indigenous, namely self-identification and native language. Albo (2005) clearly establishes the 
high correlation of this definition in Bolivia.   
8 From the whole sample, 68.39% of women had a job at least once during the year 7 
 
children of any age, 83.54% compared to 77.16%, or for young children, 60.23% compared to 
48.46%. The characteristics observed considering areas follow similar patterns.  
For the treatment of domestic violence, and given the nature of the survey, we employ self-declared 
information of violent incidents. This information, however, could be biased for two reasons: first, 
the nature of being self-declared information usually implies a classical measurement error that could 
create a bias on the estimations. Second, because women are self-declaring information on such a 
delicate topic, they may tend to downplay the incidents of domestic violence because they might feel 
uncomfortable declaring it.  
 Furthermore, it is possible that those women who have high levels of violence acceptance would 
tend to under-declare incidents of violence because they consider it to be normal, which could be a 
particular problem for indigenous women. Ellsberg et al. (2001) therefore argue that the results 
obtained for the DHS provide a fairly accurate estimation on the incidence of violence compared to 
more specialized studies. Nevertheless, if there is indeed under-declaration of domestic violence, we 
should see even greater effects because people who declare it could be the ones suffering the most. 
We identify two different types of violence against women: physical violence and psychological 
violence
9. As we can see, the incidence of physical (55.16%) and psychological ( 55.67%) violence is 
almost the same for the different groups.  Combining both concepts, the estimations show that 
66.12% women in our sample have suffered  of some kind of domestic violence. It is interesting to 
see that, within all the women in our sample, 23.54% of women perceive that domestic violence can 






                                                            
9 The definitions and identifications of these variables can be found in appendix 1. 8 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of wives, by area and ethnicity 
Standard Deviations in parenthesis 
 Variables  Full Sample  Urban  Rural  Indigenous  Non 
Indigenous 
Age  33.69  33.67  33.74  34.67  33.05 
   (8.32)  (8.18)  (8.56)  (8.39)  (8.21) 
Education in years  7.21  8.65  4.63  4.15  9.23 
(4.97)  (4.90)  (3.95)  (3.58)  (4.72) 
Indigenous =1  39.82%  27.10%  62.64% 
    (0.49)  (0.44)  (0.48) 
    HH with Children   79.70%  78.86%  81.20%  83.54%  77.16% 
older than 5  (0.40)  (0.41)  (0.39)  (0.37)  (0.42) 
HH with Children   53.15%  48.43%  61.61%  60.23%  48.46% 
younger than 5  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.50) 
Currently working  88.80%  87.90%  90.42%  91.64%  86.93% 
(0.32)  (0.33)  (0.29)  (0.28)  (0.34) 
Physical  55.16%  55.82%  53.99%  55.40%  55.01% 
Violence  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50) 
Psychological  55.67%  56.58%  54.06%  54.15%  56.69% 
Violence  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50) 
Violence Incidence   66.12%  67.12%  64.32%  64.46%  67.22% 
  (0.47)  (0.47)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.47) 
Accepts Violence  23.55%  21.20%  27.78%  26.74%  21.45% 
   (0.42)  (0.41)  (0.45)  (0.44)  (0.41) 
Urban Area  64.19% 
   
43.68%  77.77% 
   (0.48) 
   
(0.50)  (0.42) 
Number observations  7842  5034  2808  3123  4719 
 
Source: Own estimations based on DHS 2003 
 
Examining the incidence of violence between indigenous and non-indigenous women, we find that 
indigenous women present with a lower incidence of violence (64.46%) than non-indigenous ones 
(67.22%).  This  difference  can  be  basically  explained  because  non-indigenous  women  present  a 
higher  incidence  of  psychological  violence  (56.69%  versus  54.15%),  whereas  the  incidence  of 
physical violence is almost the same for both groups. It is also interesting to note that the percentage 
of non-indigenous women who accept domestic violence (21.45%) is lower than that for indigenous 
people (26.74%).  
When considering our variable of interest, labor market outcome, (100-88.8%) 11.2% of women 
who were working at one point in the year left their jobs. This proportion was relatively higher for 
urban  areas  than  rural  areas  (12.1%  versus  9.58%),  but  also  higher  for  non-indigenous  than 
indigenous people (13.07% versus 8.36%). 9 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of wives, by violence and labor outcome 
Standard Deviations in parenthesis 
  
Variables 
Full Sample  Suffer Violence  No Violence  Still working  Left job 
Age  33.69  33.78  33.52  34.19  29.73 
   (8.32)  (8.28)  (8.39)  (8.19)  (8.24) 
Education in years  7.21  7.02  7.57  7.16  7.57 
(4.97)  (4.81)  (5.25)  (5.03)  (4.47) 
Indigenous =1  39.82%  38.82%  41.78%  41.10%  29.73% 
(0.49)  (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.46) 
HH with Children   79.70%  82.01%  75.20%  81.56%  64.92% 
older than 5  (0.40)  (0.38)  (0.43)  (0.39)  (0.48) 
HH with Children   53.15%  52.98%  53.48%  52.34%  59.57% 
younger than 5  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.49) 
Currently working  88.80%  87.91%  90.55% 
    (0.32)  (0.33)  (0.29) 
    Physical  55.16%  83.43% 
 
54.71%  58.77% 
Violence  (0.50)  (0.37) 
 
(0.50)  (0.49) 
Psychological  55.67%  84.20% 
 
55.18%  59.57% 
Violence  (0.50)  (0.36) 
 
(0.50)  (0.49) 
Violence Incidence   66.12% 
   
65.45%  71.41% 
  (0.47) 
   
(0.48)  (0.45) 
Accepts Violence  23.55%  25.77%  19.23%  23.36%  25.06% 
   (0.42)  (0.44)  (0.39)  (0.42)  (0.43) 
Urban Area  64.19%  65.17%  62.29%  63.54%  69.36% 
   (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.46) 
Number observations  7842  5185  2657  6964  878 
 
Source: Own estimations based on DHS 2003 
 Some insights with respect to the effects of violence can be observed by comparing the groups that 
suffered from violence to those who did not. With respect to age and education, both groups look 
alike, with a slightly lower share of indigenous people in the group that suffered violence. The group 
that suffered violence, however, presents a rate of 2.64% (12.09%-9.45%) higher of women leaving 
their jobs. It is not surprising to see that the ratio of women accepting violence is higher among 
women who actually suffered from violence. 
The final question of interest here is to understand what makes women who left their jobs different 
from the one who kept working. The first thing we see is that women who are victims of domestic 
violence were younger than average (29.73 yrs), that the proportion of indigenous people was lower 
in this particular group, and that their households were less likely to have older kids living in them. 
Women  who  left  their  jobs  are  also  characterized  as  being  subject  to  higher rates  of  domestic 10 
 
violence. It also seems that there is a higher rate of women accepting violence among those who left 
their jobs, compared to those who kept working.  
 
4.  Analytic framework and Methodology 
Becker (1965) states that a member of a family/household decides to work if the available wage in 
the job market (wm) is higher than the opportunity cost when producing home goods (wh). This can 
also be generalized that one would decide to work if the utility of working (uw), including wages and 
the utility of working itself, is higher than the overall utility of staying at home (uh). Under this 
assumption, the decision to work or not can be estimated using a binary choice model, such that: 
                                          
  Assuming that the utility of working and staying at home can both be expressed as linear functions 
of the household characteristics, this expression could be written as: 
                                                 
In this equation, V is a binary variable that indicates whether there is domestic violence against the 
wife in the household. 
Following the literature (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986), the explanatory variable ―X‖ is used to 
specify the likelihood of working and includes demographic variables – age, age squared, education, 
ethnicity – in order to capture the potential wages one can earn in the market. We also include 
controls for region-fixed effects to capture some of the regional differences in the job market by 
state. Also, as the job market is different between urban and rural areas, the estimations use the 
urban and rural samples separately. A set of variables Z – income level, work status of the husband – 
are also included to capture additional information on household labor supply. Women in poor 
families or families where the husband is not working could show a higher probability to work. In 
addition, we also consider different variables that capture the incidence of domestic violence against 11 
 
women,  which allows us to identify the effect of  domestic violence on the  wives‘ decisions  to 
participate in the labor market.  
This model is estimated using the entire sample, but it also considers samples differentiating the 
ethnicity  of  the  wife  and  the  area  of  residency.  Considering  that  indigenous  people  are  more 
"lenient" in terms of domestic violence, we argue that the incidence of violence has a different effect 
on employment because the perception of violence is different among these ethnic groups.  
  As stated in the introduction, the problem of estimating this original model is that the estimation of 
the coefficient could be biased and inconsistent due to endogeneity problems that could arise due to 
inverse causality issues, as is mentioned in the literature review. To address the problem of reverse 
causality,  we  propose  an  alternative  approach  using  the  changes  in  labor  market  status  as  the 
dependent variable. In this sense, restricting the sample to those households in which the women 
were working at some point during the year, our dependent variable is defined as a dummy that 
assumes the value of 1 if they left their jobs (or are not working) and 0 if they stayed working. 
Using this approach, we expect to address the simultaneity between violence and job decision, as the 
sample would mainly consist of women who were already working, women for whom the decision 
to work would have already been made. At the same time, one could expect that the change in job 
status does not have an effect on the general status of violence, assuming that the violence is an 
ongoing  situation.  In  this  sense,  I  propose  a  model  to  estimate  the  probability  of  women 
losing/leaving their jobs during the year conditional on the fact that they declared to be working at 
least once during the year. The specification that will be used is as follows: 
                                                                   
Although the information on the change of job status is available in this model, this is not the case 
for  the  change  in  incidence  of  violence.  This  lack  of  information  could  still  be  a  source  of 
endogeneity. To solve this problem, the alternative is to use an instrumental variable approach in 12 
 
order  to  create  sufficient  exogenous  variation,  which  allows  for  identification  of  the  effect  of 
violence on the women‘s decisions to work.  
 In the first step, the presence of violence is estimated by applying a linear probability model (LPM) 
as suggested by Angrist and Kruger (1998), using the incidence of domestic violence in the area as 
an instrumental variable. This variable is defined as the ratio of households with domestic violence 
in relation to the total number of households in the nearby area.
10 The assumption behind this 
variable implies that  the effects from peers and  social networks can create changes in hous ehold 
behaviors, such that households could face higher levels of violence if they  are in neighborhoods 
with high levels of domestic violence. At the same time, there is an underl ying assumption that the 
domestic violence incidence in the area does not affect women‘s decisions to work. 
In the second step, the predictions of the first step this step are used to estimate the binary outcome 
model, using a probit model. The corresponding specification can be written as: 
                                                             
                                       
An alternative methodology that can be used to address the endogeneity problem could be handling 
it as part of an unobserved heterogeneity. In this sense one can assume that certain kinds of women, 
due to cultural factors or experience, tend to get involved in marriages where the incidence of 
domestic violence is more likely. This approach implies that violence is a treatment that affects the 
decisions made by the victims. To introduce this feature, we allow for a different structure that 
accounts for the binary nature of the endogenous variable. Following Heckman (1978), we change 
the first stage of our model using a latent variable model. In the first stage, we initially estimate the 
                                                            
10 For the construction of this variable, the geographical area is defined as the primary sample unit that was used for the 
construction of the survey. 13 
 
likelihood of being a victim of domestic violence. We then use the estimated mills ratio to correct 
the error term in the second stage.  
 For this approach, however, the second stage does not use a binary probit model; it uses a linear 
probability model (LPM) instead. The specification of this new model becomes: 
                                              
                                       
           
      
          
         
      
      
  
Assume that (e,v) follow a jointly normal distribution. 
The set of variables W includes characteristics such as years of education, age when first married, 
and  whether  she  is  currently  pregnant.  To  fulfill  the  identifying  conditions,  the  vector  W  also 
includes additional characteristics that could affect the women‘s propensity to get attached to a 
violent relationship. These variables are: a) if she lived in a household where her father hit her 
mother,  b)  whether  she  accepts  violence  under  certain  conditions  in  a  relationship,  and  c)  the 
average incidence of domestic violence in the area where she lives. Once the model is estimated, the 
corresponding mills ratio is introduced in the second stage regression, which is estimated using a 
Linear Probability Model (LPM).  
Under  these  considerations,  the  estimations  of  the  proposed  models  are  presented  in  the  next 
section. With all the models, they only consider the sample of women who declared themselves to 
be working during the year. 
5.  Empirical Results  
Following the existing literature, table 3 presents the results for our baseline model. We estimate the 
probability of women leaving their jobs (labor market exit), including a set of standard demographic 
variables such as family opportunity cost variables and controls for state fixed effects and other 14 
 
variables related to the husband‘s background, including the husband‘s work status, education and 
age. We also consider regional fixed effects and poverty levels in the region as proxies for labor 
demand. The first column of table 3 shows the base line results without considering any violence 
controls,  while  columns  2  to  4  include  violence  variables  (total,  physical  and  psychological 
respectively).  
Table 3. Probit model: Probability of leaving the Job, marginal effects 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
                        
Age  -0.0192***  -0.0194***  -0.0194***  -0.0193*** 
 
(0.00433)  (0.00435)  (0.00434)  (0.00434) 
Years of education  0.000501  0.000626  0.000608  0.000603 
 
(0.00153)  (0.00154)  (0.00154)  (0.00154) 
Currently Pregnant  0.0631***  0.0654***  0.0650***  0.0661*** 
 
(0.0206)  (0.0209)  (0.0208)  (0.0210) 
Children 6 years or older  0.00563*  0.00509*  0.00519*  0.00515* 
 
(0.00297)  (0.00294)  (0.00298)  (0.00295) 
Children 5 years or younger  0.00206  0.00203  0.00195  0.00196 
 
(0.00566)  (0.00570)  (0.00568)  (0.00568) 
Age at first marriage  0.00126  0.00145  0.00140  0.00144 
 




   
   
(0.00844) 
    Physical Violence 
   
0.0167** 
 
     
(0.00792) 
  Psychological Violence 
     
0.0215*** 
       
(0.00810) 
          Observations  7,095  7,095  7,095  7,095 
Notes:  Geographic, regional poverty, household income and husband related variables are included. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Complete specification can be found in Appendix A2 Table 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The controls included are the standard found in violence-labor market literature, and behaved as 
would be intuitively expected. Age is negatively related to labor market exiting, which goes in line 
with the job stability evidence found in Landa (2006). We find an insignificant positive effect of 
years of education, a result that may be implying that job mobility is higher for higher-educated 
workers, which is in line with the empirical evidence found for Bolivia in Canavire-Bacarreza (2009). 
Interestingly, we find that pregnancy has a highly positive and significant coefficient, which might 
indicate that either there is  a  certain level  of  discrimination  towards  pregnant women (Lai and 15 
 
Stanley 2005), or that women decide to leave their jobs in the short run due to their pregnancy 
(maternity  leave).  The  number  of  children  in  the  households  also  has  a  positive  relationship 
(although not highly significant) with labor market exiting; this is intuitively appealing since having 
more  children  creates  more  household  dependence  for  the  female  population  and  therefore 
working/leisure time decreases.  
Our results upon examining the effects of domestic violence on labor market exiting confirm the 
hypothesis found in the literature: that domestic violence (both physical and psychological) increases 
the probability of women exiting labor markets. We also find that psychological violence increases 
the probability of leaving a job by 1 percent more compared to physical violence. This result goes in 
line  with  the  psychological  findings  (see  O‘Leary  1999),  which  emphasizes  that  psychological 
domestic violence has a greater adverse effect on working women than physical abuse in terms of 
job performance.  
Considering that labor markets are different in urban and rural areas and for indigenous and non-
indigenous populations, we estimate the same baseline model for both areas and both ethnic groups. 




As Table 4 shows, the probability of leaving the job is higher for women in urban areas and highly 
significant compared to rural areas (except when using our instrument) ; this result corresponds to 
the hypothesis that the dynamics of job creati on and destruction in the labor market  occurs much 
more swiftly in the urban labor market than in the rural market. 
 
                                                            
11 For the instrumental variable approach, the Wald exogeneity test is not significant, indicating that our instrument is 
exogenous in the analysis, for this sample. The first step regression also showed that the instrument is highly significant 
and correlated with domestic violence. 
12  As  it  can  be  seen  in  Appendix  2  table  6,  all  the  variables  included  as  exclusion  restrictions:  regional  violence, 
intergenerational violence, acceptance of violence and age at first marriage squared, are statistically significant. 16 
 
Table 4. Probit Model: Probability of leaving the Job by area and ethnicity, marginal effects 
 
Notes: Geographic, income and husband related variables are included. 
Full specification can be found in Appendix 2, tables 6, 7 and 8  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 4 also shows that non-indigenous populations have higher probabilities of leaving the job in 
the presence of violence (physical and psychological), while indigenous populations do not show any 
significant effect of violence on job exit, although the estimation signs are still positive. These results 
indicate that if indigenous women are working, the incidence of violence would have almost no 
effect on their decisions to leave their jobs. Perhaps this evidence also indicates that indigenous 
people  are  usually  less  affected  by  intra-household  violence  because  they  see  it  as  a  ―normal‖ 
outcome of marriage. In summation, this compelling evidence is in line with our initial argument 
that indigenous women are more accepting of domestic violence and do not change their behavior 
because of it, while non-indigenous women are more responsive to domestic violence. 
Given that there is a high correlation between education, incomes and the differences between 
indigenous and non-indigenous population, we would expect the effects to differ along the income 
distribution. 
As was presented before, Table 5 presents the results for the effect of violence on labor market exit 
along the income distribution, and except for the second quintile, the results are mostly insignificant. 
This initial result leads us to think that there could also be some heterogeneous impacts along the 
distribution of income; therefore, we proceed to examine the effects of violence on non-indigenous 
VARIABLES 
Urban  Rural 
Probit  IV neighbor  Selection  Probit 
IV 




     
    Violence  0.0269**  0.0487  0.0666*  0.0173*  0.0446*  0.0484** 
 
(0.012)  (0.037)  (0.034)  (0.010)  (0.024)  (0.023) 
   Indigena  No indigena 
   Probit  IV neighbor  Selection  Probit 
IV 




     
    Violence  0.00969  0.0405  0.037  0.0390***  0.0545*  0.0778** 
   (0.010)  (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.012)  (0.036)  (0.034) 17 
 
and indigenous populations. Looking at the differentiated effects for indigenous and non-indigenous 
populations, we find interesting results.  
 Poor indigenous populations (Quintiles 1 to 3) present an insignificant effect of violence, while 
richer ones have a positive and highly significant effect. For non-indigenous populations, we find the 
opposite: Poor segments of the population (Q1 to Q3) show significant and positive effects, while 
richer segments (Q4 and Q5) have extremely small and non-significant effects.  
These  results  support  our  argument  that  there  are  two  different  stories  driving  the  effects  of 
domestic violence and their correlation with the education and income characteristics of people. On 
the indigenous side, people at the highest quintiles receive better education and become more aware 
of what domestic violence is, becoming more responsive to violence. On the non-indigenous side, 
people in the middle, middle-lower and lower quintiles are more responsive to violence because they 
do not consider domestic violence to be normal. This might translate into their decisions being more 
sensitive  to  violence.  The  small  and  insignificant  effects  on  higher  quintiles  of  non-indigenous 
populations can mainly be explained by the lower intensity of violence in this group.
13 It could also 
be the case that  in  households where violence was already affecting the marriage, the couple 
divorced (Bowlus and Saitz, 2006). The remaining sample (the one we observe) is composed of the 
less-responsive ones.  
 
                                                            
13 While 49.35% of indigenous women in the highest quintile declared to have suffered from some kind of physical 
domestic violence frequently, this ratio is much lower among non-ingenuous women (36.89%). The situation is similar 
considering only psychological violence. The incidence of frequent Psychological violence is 33.91% for non-indigenous 
women of the highest quintile, compared to 43.29% for indigenous women. 18 
 
Table 5. Probability of leaving the Job by ethnicity and income, marginal effects 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  
  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample 
  Probit  IV   Selec  Probit  IV   Selec  Probit  IV   Selec  Probit  IV   Selec  Probit  IV   Selec 
Violence  0.0144 
 
   0.0399*** 
   
0.011 
   
0.0258 
   
0.011 
   
 
(0.014)        (0.012) 
   
(0.028) 
   
(0.02) 
   
(0.017)       
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4-Q5 
 
Indigenas   Indigenas   Indigenas   Indigenas  
   Probit  IV   Selec  Probit  IV   Selec  Probit  IV   Selec  Probit  IV   Selection 
Violence  -0.0032  0.00382  0.0213  0.0163  0.0358  0.0235  -0.0395  0.0771  0.0223  0.0531**  0.0586  0.102 
   (0.02)  (0.033)  (0.027)  (0.012)  (0.029)  (0.049)  (0.03)  (0.099)  (0.089)  (0.022)  (0.087)  (0.112) 
 
Q1-Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  
 
Non-Indigenous   Non-Indigenous  Non-Indigenous  Non-Indigenous 
   Probit  IV   Selec  Probit  IV   Selec  Probit  IV   Selec  Probit  IV   Selec 
Violence  0.0932***  0.136***  0.169***  0.064*  0.0978  0.161**  0.016  0.0811  0.056  0.001  -0.0326  -0.0188 
   (0.019)  (0.047)  (0.055)  (0.03)  (0.094)  (0.080)  (0.03)  (0.060)  (0.062)  (0.01)  (0.053)  (0.081) 
Notes: Similar covariates as in table 3, geographic, regional poverty, income and husband related variables are included. For Indigenous population  
we merge Q4 and Q5 due to small sample problems. Similarly for Non-Indigenous populations Q1 and Q2 are merged.  
Full results for the simple probit can be found in the Appendix A2, Tables 3, 4 and 5 
Corrections using instrumental variables and treatment selection are in Tables 9 and 10  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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 5.1 Robustness of the estimation: What explains the differences? 
As we addressed in the previous section, indigenous peoples have a smaller response to violence 
than non-indigenous people. The following step is to identify which factors could better explain this 
behavior. In Table 6, we present probit models using different subgroups and concepts, attempting 
to search for an explanation. 
 Our first hypothesis is related to acceptance. If women accept violence as normal behavior, we 
would expect that they would be less responsive than women who do not accept violence.  
 Using self-declared information on their perceptions of domestic violence, we find that women 
who accept violence are even more responsive to domestic violence. Among non-indigenous people, 
for instance, the marginal effect was 0.0861 if they accept violence compared to 0.0261 if they do 
not.  Although  a  similar  pattern  can  be  seen  for  indigenous  women,  domestic  violence  is  not 
significant in either case. 
One  characteristic  of  indigenous  women  is  that  they  are,  in  general,  less  educated  than  non- 
indigenous women.  If we compare women with similar levels of education, they could possibly have 
similar responsive behaviors. When considering less educated women (those with less than 5 years 
of education), we find that non-indigenous women are more responsive than average (0.0559), while 
indigenous women with the same level of education show no significant difference. In the case of 
women with average levels of education (6 to 11 years), both groups of women show relatively high 
and significant responsiveness to violence, although it is still higher among non-indigenous people. 
No significant effects are seen for people with 12 years of education or more. 
The civil status of women could also affect the differences in their reactions to violence. People who 
are married might have weaker reactions than people who are ―living together,‖ because they are tied 
together with a stronger commitment. This stronger commitment could make certain threats (being 
abandoned, for example) less credible. We find that people who are living together have a strong  
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and more significant response to violence compared to people who are married. Domestic violence, 
however, still shows no significant effect on indigenous women. 
An alternative to analysis is that instead of analyzing differences of the women‘s characteristics, we 
try to consider  the differences in  the  nature of  violence against women. The first factor  being 
consider is intensity.  
 Using each variable of physical and psychological violence described in the appendix 1, we create an 
index giving an equal weight to each source of violence
14. This index is transformed into dummy 
variables indicating if the women answered passively in at least 1, 2, 3 and 4 variables
15. We find that 
only being a victim (at least one positive answer) seems to be the most important factor when 
considering domestic violence, since further dummies remain no significant. For indigenous women, 
none of the dummies were shown to be significant. Nevertheless, one should notice the coefficients 
are not small for all the cases. 
In the survey, besides considering information on domestic violence, information is also provided 
on whether or not women declared that someone else physically hurt her, besides her husband. 
Including this as an explanatory variable shows that it seems to have an even stronger effect on a 
women‘s decision of leaving the market. We still observe that indigenous women are less responsive 






                                                            
14 The index is the sum of positive responses to domestic examples given during the survey interview, eg. If a woman 
answers positively in three questions, the index take value of 3. 
15 The index goes up to 10, but only the first 4 were used in the regression.  
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Table 6. Robustness test and different specifications 
 
Entire Sample  Indigenous   Non indigenous 
Base line Probit model  0.0249***  0.00969  0.0390*** 
 
(0.008)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
Acceptance of violence 
      Accepts  0.0460***  0.0197  0.0861*** 
 
(0.0154)  (0.0145)  (0.0234) 
Do not accept  0.0176*  0.00734  0.0261** 
 
(0.00949)  (0.0115)  (0.0130) 
Education 
      Less than 5 years of education  0.00994  -0.00432  0.0559*** 
 
(0.00991)  (0.0107)  (0.0196) 
Between 6 and 11 years of 
education  0.0780***  0.0506***  0.0834*** 
 
(0.0193)  (0.0174)  (0.0225) 
12 years of education  -0.00360  0.0170  -0.00223 
 
(0.0251)  (0.0487)  (0.0244) 








      Married  0.0122  0.00761  0.0183 
 
(0.00893)  (0.0106)  (0.0142) 
Living together  0.0566**  0.0135  0.0857*** 
 
(0.0226)  (0.0271)  (0.0247) 
Violence intensity (up to 10) 
      Possitive on at least 1   0.0328**  0.0216  0.0440** 
 
(0.0132)  (0.0145)  (0.0201) 
Possitive on at least 2  -0.0127  -0.0314  0.000802 
 
(0.0154)  (0.0234)  (0.0246) 
Possitive on at least 3  0.00985  0.0283  -0.00448 
 
(0.0202)  (0.0305)  (0.0265) 
Possitive on at least 4  -0.00856  -0.0111  -0.00558 
 
(0.0165)  (0.0218)  (0.0245) 
Someone else hurt her 
      Violence   0.0238***  0.00875  0.0379*** 
 
(0.00847)  (0.0103)  (0.0122) 
Other person  0.0378**  0.0207  0.0553** 
 
(0.0177)  (0.0207)  (0.0244) 
Violence under drugs or alcohol 
      Violence  0.0236**  0.0200*  0.0292** 
 
(0.00953)  (0.0117)  (0.0139) 
Under Drugs or Alcohol  0.00330  -0.0210*  0.0268 
 
(0.0110)  (0.0115)  (0.0182) 
Without considering D A violence  0.0265***  0.0240*  0.0280** 
 
(0.0100)  (0.0129)  (0.0137) 
Only considering D A violence  0.00122  -0.0238**  0.0254 
 
(0.0117)  (0.0121)  (0.0189) 
All regressions follow the base line probit specification 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
Finally, we try to differentiate the circumstances of when the husband hurt their wives. Specifically, 
we use information about when women declared that their husband was under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs when he hit her, and use it as an additional explanatory variable in the specification.  
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The results here are unexpected. For non-indigenous women, domestic violence alone has a 
relatively smaller effect than in the baseline model, and although violence under alcohol is not 
significant, its coefficient has a similar magnitude. More surprising is the effect of this variable for 
the indigenous women specification. On the one hand, violence itself becomes significant (0.02 
marginal effect), which is now comparable to the marginal effect of domestic violence of non-
indigenous women. On the other hand, domestic violence under the effect of alcohol is significant, 
but with a negative coefficient, meaning that this kind of violence reduces the probability of leaving 
the job market. 
Trying to exploit these findings further, we estimate two additional models for subsamples where: 
women who suffered from violence under drugs or alcohol are excluded, and where women who 
suffer domestic violence not under the influence of alcohol or drugs are excluded. In the first case, 
we find that domestic violence has a significant and positive effect on the probability of leaving the 
job market for both indigenous and non-indigenous women, with similar marginal effects (0.024 and 
0.028 respectively).  
 In the second, domestic violence under the effects of alcohol or drugs alone seems to have no 
effect among non-indigenous women, but has a negative and significant effect for indigenous 
women (-.0238). 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented evidence in order to analyze the heterogeneous effects of violence on the 
exit from the labor market of women in a developing country. The analysis started by modeling the 
effect of different factors, generally considered in the literature, on female labor force participation. 
This found that all variables present the expected coefficients. In the next step of the analysis, we 
included three different types of domestic violence in the estimations — physical, psychological and 
the combination of both — finding a positive and significant correlation between job exit and  
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violence, after controlling for other covariates. This indicates that there is a dominating positive 
correlation between domestic violence and women‘s exit from labor market. 
 After using different methodologies to address possible problems of endogeneity, we found that 
our  results  are  robust  across  the  different  specifications,  and,  if  anything,  our  estimations  are 
understating the effects of domestic violence. 
In respect to the cultural differences between indigenous and non-indigenous people, we found that 
there  is  indeed  a  differentiated  effect  between  these  two  groups.  Specifically,  we  found  that 
indigenous women are in general less responsive to domestic violence, except for higher income 
groups. We also found that non-indigenous women of middle and lower income are much more 
responsive to violence. 
Analyzing different hypothesis that can explain the differentiated effect of domestic violence on the 
labor market status, we find that our results are robust across alternative measures of violence and 
for specific subsamples of education, acceptance and marital status. We find, however, that the 
difference in the response greatly reduces when we exclude the observations when the husband has 
problems with alcohol or drugs. 
Some issues remain for further research. First, it is possible that women can also decide to terminate 
their marriages instead of leaving their jobs, particularly women with high education levels and 
income. This possibility should be taken into consideration in further research to analyze if it 
changes the conclusions obtained in this paper. Second, the present analysis focused on women‘s 
decisions to leave their jobs; however, it might be interesting to analyze what the effects would be 
on the actual decision of entering in the job market subject and the incidence of domestic violence. 
Third, although women are the main victims of violence, one could also analyze if there is any effect 
on men‘s labor status when they are the victims.  
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Appendix 1 Variable definitions 
 Variables  Definition 
Age  Age of wife in years 
Age Square  Age square of wife in years 
Education in years  Years of educations 
Income  Income index 1(poorest) to 5  (richest) 
Indigenous =1  1 if indigenous, identified by language spoken during childhood 
No of Children older than 5  Number of own children older than 5 years old 
No of Children younger than 5  Number of own children born in the last 5 years 
Worked during the year  1 if wife declare to have worked in the last year 
Currently working  1 if wife declare to be working 
Husband works  1 if husband works in the labor market 
Husband Age  Husband age in years 
Husband Education  Husband education in years 
Physical Violence   1 if women declared to have suffered frequently or some times on 
the following situations 
-  Spouse ever pushed you 
-  spouse ever hit you with his hand/foot 
-  spouse ever hit you with something harmful 
-  spouse ever tried to strangle you 
-  spouse ever forced you to have sex 
Psyco. Violence  1 if women declared to have suffered frequently or some times on 
the following situations 
-  husband  accuses her of unfaithfulness 
-  husband  tried to limit her contact with family 
-  husband  tells you "you are good for nothing" 
-  husband  threatened you with "he will leave the house‖ 
-  husband  tells you "he would not give you economical 
support" 
Urban Area  1 if wife lives in the urban areas 
Wife Violence acceptance  1 if women declare any of the following: 
-  wife beating justified if she goes out without telling him 
-  wife beating justified if she neglects the children 
-  wife beating justified if she argues with him 
-  wife beating justified if she refuses to have sex with him 
-  wife beating justified if she burns the food 
Intergenerational Violence  1 if women answer positive to: 
-  did your father ever beat your mother? 




Table A2.1 Determinants of Job exit, Probit Model Marginal effects 
 VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
                    Age  -0.0192***  -0.0194***  -0.0194***  -0.0193*** 
 
(0.00433)  (0.00435)  (0.00434)  (0.00434) 
Age Squared  0.000193***  0.000196***  0.000196***  0.000194*** 
 
(6.39e-05)  (6.40e-05)  (6.40e-05)  (6.39e-05) 
Years of education  0.000501  0.000626  0.000608  0.000603 
 
(0.00153)  (0.00154)  (0.00154)  (0.00154) 
Currently Pregnant  0.0631***  0.0654***  0.0650***  0.0661*** 
 
(0.0206)  (0.0209)  (0.0208)  (0.0210) 
Income Q=2  0.0126  0.0106  0.0112  0.0111 
 
(0.0163)  (0.0161)  (0.0162)  (0.0162) 
Income Q=3  0.0519**  0.0507**  0.0510**  0.0511** 
 
(0.0236)  (0.0234)  (0.0235)  (0.0234) 
Income Q=4  0.0205  0.0191  0.0192  0.0192 
 
(0.0219)  (0.0217)  (0.0217)  (0.0217) 
Income Q=5  0.0154  0.0158  0.0158  0.0153 
 
(0.0245)  (0.0243)  (0.0243)  (0.0243) 
No of Children 6 years or older  0.00563*  0.00509*  0.00519*  0.00515* 
 
(0.00297)  (0.00294)  (0.00298)  (0.00295) 
No of Children 5 years or younger  0.00206  0.00203  0.00195  0.00196 
 
(0.00566)  (0.00570)  (0.00568)  (0.00568) 
Region 2  -0.0678***  -0.0676***  -0.0681***  -0.0672*** 
 
(0.0141)  (0.0139)  (0.0139)  (0.0139) 
Region 3  -0.0460***  -0.0451***  -0.0461***  -0.0447*** 
 
(0.0141)  (0.0140)  (0.0140)  (0.0141) 
Region 4  -0.0410***  -0.0406***  -0.0413***  -0.0403*** 
 
(0.0138)  (0.0136)  (0.0136)  (0.0136) 
Region 5  -0.0246  -0.0249  -0.0253  -0.0239 
 
(0.0186)  (0.0184)  (0.0184)  (0.0186) 
Region 6  -0.00615  -0.00617  -0.00644  -0.00549 
 
(0.0196)  (0.0194)  (0.0194)  (0.0195) 
Region 7  0.0102  0.0115  0.0110  0.0123 
 
(0.0182)  (0.0181)  (0.0181)  (0.0181) 
Region 8  -0.0388***  -0.0378***  -0.0384***  -0.0374*** 
 
(0.0144)  (0.0143)  (0.0144)  (0.0144) 
Region 9  0.0424  0.0475  0.0441  0.0473 
 
(0.0325)  (0.0328)  (0.0326)  (0.0328) 
Age at first marriage  0.00126  0.00145  0.00140  0.00144 
 
(0.00115)  (0.00115)  (0.00115)  (0.00114) 
Husband works  0.00531  0.00597  0.00543  0.00707 
 
(0.0232)  (0.0228)  (0.0231)  (0.0226) 
Husband Age  -0.000269  -0.000231  -0.000182  -0.000248 
 
(0.000926)  (0.000914)  (0.000921)  (0.000917) 
Husband Education  2.98e-05  5.14e-05  5.03e-05  2.49e-05 
 
(0.000353)  (0.000353)  (0.000353)  (0.000355) 
Indigenous  -0.00413  -0.00204  -0.00298  -0.00252 
 
(0.0120)  (0.0119)  (0.0119)  (0.0119) 
Urban area  0.0296**  0.0281**  0.0283**  0.0287** 
 
(0.0130)  (0.0128)  (0.0129)  (0.0129) 
Poverty Level   0.000125  0.000142  0.000132  0.000136 
 




   
   
(0.00844) 
    Physical Violence 
   
0.0167** 
 
     
(0.00792) 
  Psychological Violence 
     
0.0215*** 
       
(0.00810) 
          Observations  7,095  7,095  7,095  7,095 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.2. Determinants of Job exit, by area and ethnicity 
            VARIABLES  Full Sample  Urban  Rural  Indigenous  Non-Indigenous 
Age  -0.0194***  -0.0254***  -0.0102*  -0.0144**  -0.0249*** 
 
(0.00435)  (0.00608)  (0.00526)  (0.00561)  (0.00581) 
Age Squared  0.000196***  0.000262***  0.000103  0.000130*  0.000269*** 
 
(6.40e-05)  (9.03e-05)  (7.34e-05)  (7.76e-05)  (8.70e-05) 
Years of education  0.000626  0.00100  0.000626  0.00147  0.000273 
 
(0.00154)  (0.00225)  (0.00175)  (0.00210)  (0.00226) 
Currently Pregnant  0.0654***  0.0533*  0.0750***  0.0530*  0.0669** 
 
(0.0209)  (0.0290)  (0.0275)  (0.0279)  (0.0292) 
Income Q=2  0.0106  -0.0423  0.0190  0.0199  -0.0180 
 
(0.0161)  (0.0388)  (0.0126)  (0.0169)  (0.0225) 
Income Q=3  0.0507**  0.00695  0.0417  0.0800**  4.86e-05 
 
(0.0234)  (0.0538)  (0.0302)  (0.0312)  (0.0287) 
Income Q=4  0.0191  -0.0221  -0.00791  0.0578*  -0.0302 
 
(0.0217)  (0.0505)  (0.0223)  (0.0348)  (0.0287) 
Income Q=5  0.0158  -0.0251  -0.0510***  0.0623  -0.0339 
 
(0.0243)  (0.0521)  (0.00874)  (0.0624)  (0.0329) 
No of Children 6 years or older  0.00509*  0.00247  0.00597*  0.00591*  0.00479 
 
(0.00294)  (0.00432)  (0.00343)  (0.00333)  (0.00491) 
No of Children 5 years or younger  0.00203  -0.00403  0.00685  0.00701  -0.00568 
 
(0.00570)  (0.00878)  (0.00521)  (0.00542)  (0.0102) 
Region 2  -0.0676***  -0.0286  -0.0849***  -0.0686***  -0.0577** 
 
(0.0139)  (0.0261)  (0.0112)  (0.0151)  (0.0235) 
Region 3  -0.0451***  -0.0130  -0.0577***  -0.0476***  -0.0274 
 
(0.0140)  (0.0260)  (0.0120)  (0.0144)  (0.0255) 
Region 4  -0.0406***  0.00976  -0.0549***  -0.0513***  -0.00897 
 
(0.0136)  (0.0313)  (0.00724)  (0.00932)  (0.0283) 
Region 5  -0.0249  0.0199  -0.0416***  -0.0217  -0.0398 
 
(0.0184)  (0.0365)  (0.0125)  (0.0172)  (0.0247) 
Region 6  -0.00617  0.0370  -0.0182  0.00929  0.000457 
 
(0.0194)  (0.0342)  (0.0219)  (0.0363)  (0.0276) 
Region 7  0.0115  0.0519*  0.0100  0.00130  0.0302 
 
(0.0181)  (0.0297)  (0.0195)  (0.0223)  (0.0258) 
Region 8  -0.0378***  -0.00245  -0.0405***  -0.0580***  -0.0322 
 
(0.0143)  (0.0293)  (0.0117)  (0.00795)  (0.0231) 
Region 9  0.0475  0.115**  0.00996  -0.00851  0.0780* 
 
(0.0328)  (0.0557)  (0.0364)  (0.0608)  (0.0452) 
Age at first marriage  0.00145  0.00215  0.000277  0.00120  0.00235 
 
(0.00115)  (0.00154)  (0.00150)  (0.00147)  (0.00186) 
Husband works  0.00597  0.00766  0.00319  0.0443***  -0.0171 
 
(0.0228)  (0.0287)  (0.0347)  (0.0132)  (0.0355) 
Husband Age  -0.000231  0.000352  -0.00116  4.16e-05  -0.000357 
 
(0.000914)  (0.00138)  (0.000827)  (0.000966)  (0.00130) 
Husband Education  5.14e-05  -0.000398  0.000355  0.000130  8.39e-05 
 
(0.000353)  (0.000544)  (0.000335)  (0.000328)  (0.000677) 
Indigenous  -0.00204  0.00742  0.00830 
   
 
(0.0119)  (0.0173)  (0.0138) 
    Urban area  0.0281** 
   
0.0227  0.0311* 
 
(0.0128) 
   
(0.0165)  (0.0169) 
Poverty Level   0.000142  6.21e-05  -0.000157  0.000593  -0.000121 
 
(0.000349)  (0.000439)  (0.000524)  (0.000420)  (0.000493) 
Violence  0.0249***  0.0269**  0.0173*  0.00969  0.0390*** 
 
(0.00844)  (0.0118)  (0.00995)  (0.0102)  (0.0121) 
            Observations  7,095  4,456  2,639  2,946  4,149 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.3. Determinants of Job Exit, Entire Sample by income group 
 VARIABLES  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
                             
Age  -0.00966  -0.0104*  -0.0406***  -0.0197**  -0.0180* 
 
(0.00696)  (0.00627)  (0.0110)  (0.00936)  (0.0108) 
Age Squared  9.12e-05  0.000109  0.000446**  0.000205  0.000162 
 
(9.77e-05)  (8.78e-05)  (0.000177)  (0.000139)  (0.000146) 
Years of education  0.00365  0.00127  -0.000613  0.00181  -0.000142 
 
(0.00347)  (0.00181)  (0.00335)  (0.00324)  (0.00357) 
Currently Pregnant  0.0450  0.129***  0.0802  0.00418  0.0661 
 
(0.0313)  (0.0455)  (0.0513)  (0.0369)  (0.0527) 
No of Children 6 years or older  0.0107**  -0.000467  0.0106  -0.00715  0.00789 
 
(0.00445)  (0.00397)  (0.00879)  (0.00679)  (0.00800) 
No of Children 5 years or younger  0.00717  0.0154**  -0.0175  -0.00557  -0.00398 
 
(0.00703)  (0.00721)  (0.0133)  (0.0162)  (0.0151) 
Region 2  -0.0862***  -0.0942***  -0.0616  -0.0283  -0.00911 
 
(0.0161)  (0.0214)  (0.0427)  (0.0364)  (0.0293) 
Region 3  -0.0539***  -0.0435***  -0.0701**  -0.00356  -0.00889 
 
(0.0170)  (0.0168)  (0.0340)  (0.0401)  (0.0331) 
Region 4 
 
-0.0355**  -0.0419  0.00637  0.00425 
   
(0.0143)  (0.0367)  (0.0500)  (0.0496) 
Region 5  -0.0492***  -0.0297  0.0436  -0.0105  -0.0373 
 
(0.0170)  (0.0191)  (0.0609)  (0.0437)  (0.0301) 
Region 6  -0.0492***  0.0243  0.00813  0.0660  0.00549 
 
(0.0109)  (0.0458)  (0.0567)  (0.0571)  (0.0336) 
Region 7  -0.00963  0.0385  -0.0394  0.0568  0.0787** 
 
(0.0225)  (0.0358)  (0.0404)  (0.0451)  (0.0383) 
Region 8  -0.0413***  0.0174  -0.0862***  -0.0261  -0.0365 
 
(0.0143)  (0.0397)  (0.0283)  (0.0376)  (0.0273) 
Region 9  -0.00585  0.0923  -0.0240  0.0612  0.156 
 
(0.0400)  (0.0750)  (0.0526)  (0.0813)  (0.112) 
Age at first marriage  0.000324  0.00218  0.00648*  0.00379  -0.00383* 
 
(0.00218)  (0.00168)  (0.00377)  (0.00280)  (0.00212) 
Husband works 
 
0.0201  0.0330  0.0509  -0.0492 
   
(0.0274)  (0.0496)  (0.0345)  (0.0532) 
Husband Age  -0.00220**  0.000187  -0.000223  0.000438  0.000172 
 
(0.00112)  (0.00114)  (0.00308)  (0.00183)  (0.00161) 
Husband Education  0.000243  0.000497  -0.000487  -4.74e-05  0.000706 
 
(0.000425)  (0.000509)  (0.000895)  (0.000857)  (0.00109) 
Indigenous  -0.0111  0.0166  -0.0162  0.0210  0.00850 
 
(0.0222)  (0.0167)  (0.0222)  (0.0352)  (0.0374) 
Urban area  0.0169  -0.0120  0.0439  0.0523**  0.0814*** 
 
(0.0361)  (0.0139)  (0.0270)  (0.0250)  (0.00960) 
Poverty Level   0.000322  -0.000521  -0.000343  0.000101  0.000622 
 
(0.000905)  (0.000547)  (0.000693)  (0.000687)  (0.000682) 
Violence  0.0144  0.0399***  0.0110  0.0258  0.0110 
 
(0.0141)  (0.0122)  (0.0277)  (0.0202)  (0.0170) 
            Observations  1,072  1,419  1,521  1,592  1,397 
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Table A2.4. Determinants of Job Exit, Indigenous people by income group 
 VARIABLES  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4-Q5 
Age  -0.0116  -0.00991  -0.0317**  -0.0118 
 
(0.00743)  (0.00741)  (0.0151)  (0.0128) 
Age Squared  0.000115  5.68e-05  0.000310  0.000129 
 
(0.000104)  (0.000104)  (0.000204)  (0.000178) 
Years of education  0.00652  1.34e-05  9.95e-05  0.00154 
 
(0.00409)  (0.00199)  (0.00476)  (0.00432) 
Currently Pregnant  0.0305  0.0687*  0.113  -0.00970 
 
(0.0287)  (0.0416)  (0.114)  (0.0495) 
No of Children 6 years or older  0.00828*  0.00620*  0.0142  -0.0111 
 
(0.00475)  (0.00370)  (0.0119)  (0.00695) 
No of Children 5 years or younger  0.0109  0.0132*  -0.000474  -0.0222 
 
(0.00754)  (0.00704)  (0.0162)  (0.0163) 
Region 2  -0.0909***  -0.0389*  -0.0830  -0.0123 
 
(0.0185)  (0.0217)  (0.0531)  (0.0428) 
Region 3  -0.0631***  -0.00613  -0.0920**  -0.0509 
 
(0.0174)  (0.0213)  (0.0388)  (0.0346) 
Region 4 
 
0.00318  -0.0835***  -0.0192 
   
(0.0284)  (0.0280)  (0.0500) 
Region 5  -0.0518***  0.0121  0.0514  -0.0385 
 
(0.0141)  (0.0305)  (0.0770)  (0.0305) 
Region 6 
 
0.242  0.0819  -0.0233 
   
(0.168)  (0.117)  (0.0346) 
Region 7  -0.0107  0.123  -0.0560  0.0120 
 
(0.0228)  (0.0842)  (0.0423)  (0.0477) 
Region 8 
     
-0.0460 
       
(0.0310) 
Region 9 
   
0.158 
 
     
(0.280) 
  Age at first marriage  0.00165  0.00207  0.00927*  -0.00474 
 
(0.00228)  (0.00164)  (0.00483)  (0.00308) 
Husband works 
 
0.0204  0.0473 
 
   
(0.0188)  (0.0495) 
  Husband Age  -0.000160  0.00169  1.30e-05  -0.00180 
 
(0.000962)  (0.00125)  (0.00277)  (0.00214) 
Husband Education  0.000300  0.000493  -0.000272  -0.00151** 
 
(0.000367)  (0.000386)  (0.00105)  (0.000630) 
Urban area 
 
0.000563  0.0279  0.0609*** 
   
(0.0161)  (0.0333)  (0.0195) 
Poverty Level   0.00135  0.000289  0.000509  -0.000969 
 
(0.00107)  (0.000576)  (0.000801)  (0.000775) 
Violence  -0.00329  0.0163  -0.0395  0.0531** 
 
(0.0148)  (0.0123)  (0.0345)  (0.0216) 
Income Q=4 
     
0.0110 
       
(0.0313) 
Observations  717  816  648  628 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.5 Determinants of Job Exit, Non-indigenous people by income group 
 VARIABLES  Q1-Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
                    Age  -0.0164*  -0.0457***  -0.0295***  -0.0192* 
 
(0.00904)  (0.0150)  (0.0111)  (0.0107) 
Age Squared  0.000265**  0.000522**  0.000312*  0.000164 
 
(0.000128)  (0.000255)  (0.000164)  (0.000145) 
Years of education  0.00311  -0.00154  -0.000570  0.000621 
 
(0.00311)  (0.00392)  (0.00322)  (0.00412) 
Currently Pregnant  0.182***  0.0478  -0.0124  0.0896 
 
(0.0559)  (0.0607)  (0.0383)  (0.0590) 
No of Children 6 years or older  -0.00485  0.0104  0.00228  0.0117 
 
(0.00731)  (0.0114)  (0.00923)  (0.00909) 
No of Children 5 years or younger  0.00682  -0.0420*  -0.00629  0.00381 
 
(0.0115)  (0.0230)  (0.0213)  (0.0163) 
Region 2  -0.144***  -0.0314  -0.000854  -0.0132 
 
(0.0223)  (0.0788)  (0.0546)  (0.0354) 
Region 3  -0.0771***  -0.00130  0.0685  0.00277 
 
(0.0252)  (0.0814)  (0.0732)  (0.0411) 
Region 4  -0.0875***  0.0547  0.0782  -0.0118 
 
(0.0164)  (0.0917)  (0.0838)  (0.0483) 
Region 5  -0.0945***  0.0140  0.0102  -0.0286 
 
(0.0156)  (0.0820)  (0.0590)  (0.0366) 
Region 6  -0.0780***  0.0249  0.137  0.00524 
 
(0.0270)  (0.0881)  (0.0843)  (0.0375) 
Region 7  -0.0253  0.000328  0.106*  0.0869** 
 
(0.0392)  (0.0704)  (0.0601)  (0.0434) 
Region 8  -0.0634**  -0.0626  0.00611  -0.0328 
 
(0.0297)  (0.0543)  (0.0585)  (0.0318) 
Region 9  0.0187  0.0186  0.123  0.156 
 
(0.0628)  (0.0899)  (0.113)  (0.117) 
Age at first marriage  0.000978  0.00377  0.00938**  -0.00322 
 
(0.00322)  (0.00509)  (0.00377)  (0.00223) 
Husband works  0.0179  0.0304  0.0335  -0.0693 
 
(0.0769)  (0.0685)  (0.0476)  (0.0610) 
Husband Age  -0.00362**  -0.000987  0.000991  0.00121 
 
(0.00169)  (0.00403)  (0.00230)  (0.00157) 
Husband Education  -0.000760  -0.000459  0.00138  -2.84e-05 
 
(0.000789)  (0.00147)  (0.00127)  (0.00154) 
Urban area  -0.00789  0.0416  0.0418  0.0816*** 
 
(0.0243)  (0.0358)  (0.0331)  (0.0117) 
Poverty Level   -0.00200*  -0.000852  0.000953  0.000776 
 
(0.00102)  (0.00114)  (0.000903)  (0.000816) 
Violence  0.0932***  0.0646*  0.0168  0.00138 
 
(0.0185)  (0.0342)  (0.0247)  (0.0189) 
Income Q=2  0.00412 
     
 
(0.0214) 
      Observations  934  869  1,125  1,221 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.6. Determinants of Job exit, Entire Sample and Different corrections 
     
Treat-Selection 
VARIABLES  Probit  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ 
Age  -0.0194***  -0.0198***  -0.0313*** 
 
 
(0.00435)  (0.00440)  (0.00566) 
  Age Squared  0.000196***  0.000202***  0.000364*** 
 
 
(6.40e-05)  (6.41e-05)  (7.73e-05) 
  Years of education  0.000626  0.000764  0.000914  -0.00668* 
 
(0.00154)  (0.00155)  (0.00159)  (0.00364) 
Currently Pregnant  0.0654***  0.0687***  0.0753***  -0.194*** 
 
(0.0209)  (0.0219)  (0.0234)  (0.0693) 
Income Q=2  0.0106  0.00814  0.00734 
 
 
(0.0161)  (0.0162)  (0.0132) 
  Income Q=3  0.0507**  0.0485**  0.0423** 
 
 
(0.0234)  (0.0232)  (0.0192) 
  Income Q=4  0.0191  0.0174  0.00922 
 
 
(0.0217)  (0.0219)  (0.0204) 
  Income Q=5  0.0158  0.0166  0.00693 
 
 
(0.0243)  (0.0244)  (0.0237) 
  No of Children 6 years or older  0.00509*  0.00453  0.00497** 
 
 
(0.00294)  (0.00295)  (0.00246) 
  No of Children 5 years or younger  0.00203  0.00239  -0.000655 
 
 
(0.00570)  (0.00567)  (0.00615) 
  Region 2  -0.0676***  -0.0676***  -0.0729*** 
 
 
(0.0139)  (0.0139)  (0.0210) 
  Region 3  -0.0451***  -0.0445***  -0.0512** 
 
 
(0.0140)  (0.0140)  (0.0206) 
  Region 4  -0.0406***  -0.0404***  -0.0507** 
 
 
(0.0136)  (0.0136)  (0.0224) 
  Region 5  -0.0249  -0.0249  -0.0298 
 
 
(0.0184)  (0.0185)  (0.0254) 
  Region 6  -0.00617  -0.00626  -0.00319 
 
 
(0.0194)  (0.0192)  (0.0257) 
  Region 7  0.0115  0.0133  0.0244 
 
 
(0.0181)  (0.0180)  (0.0218) 
  Region 8  -0.0378***  -0.0367**  -0.0422* 
 
 
(0.0143)  (0.0144)  (0.0236) 
  Region 9  0.0475  0.0537  0.0826** 
 
 
(0.0328)  (0.0330)  (0.0362) 
  Age at first marriage  0.00145  0.00156  0.00165  -0.0865*** 
 
(0.00115)  (0.00116)  (0.00102)  (0.0270) 
Husband works  0.00597  0.00872  0.00481 
 
 
(0.0228)  (0.0224)  (0.0274) 
  Husband Age  -0.000231  -0.000206  -0.000412 
 
 
(0.000914)  (0.000917)  (0.000929) 
  Husband Education  5.14e-05  7.18e-05  3.31e-05 
 
 
(0.000353)  (0.000356)  (0.000346) 
  Indigenous  -0.00204  -0.000459  0.00284 
 
 
(0.0119)  (0.0119)  (0.0127) 
  Urban area  0.0281**  0.0267**  0.0270** 
 
 
(0.0128)  (0.0130)  (0.0137) 
  Poverty Level   0.000142  0.000147  3.92e-06 
 
 
(0.000349)  (0.000349)  (0.000371) 
  Violence  0.0249***  0.0530**  0.0638*** 
 
 
(0.00844)  (0.0237)  (0.0215) 
  Reg. Violence 
     
2.918*** 
       
(0.0915) 
Intergenerational Violence 
     
0.271*** 
       
(0.0396) 
Accepts Violence 
     
0.202*** 
       
(0.0527) 
Age at first Marriage^2 
     
0.00172*** 
       
(0.000598) 
Cosntant 
   
0.637***  -0.547* 
     
(0.108)  (0.302) 
Exogeneity Test (chi2 k=1) 
 
1.55 (p= 0.2131) 
    Observations  7,095  7,095  7,092  7,092 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.7. Determinants of Job exit, Entire Sample and Different corrections. By area 
 
Urban Area  Rural Area 
     
Treat-Selection 
   
Treat-Selection 
VARIABLES  Probit  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ  Probit  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ 
                  Age  -0.0254***  -0.0253***  -0.0389*** 
 
-0.0102*  -0.0112**  -0.0181** 
 
 
(0.00608)  (0.00619)  (0.00797) 
 
(0.00526)  (0.00527)  (0.00706) 
  Age Squared  0.000262***  0.000261***  0.000455*** 
 
0.000103  0.000118  0.000217** 
 
 
(9.03e-05)  (9.16e-05)  (0.000110) 
 
(7.34e-05)  (7.31e-05)  (9.42e-05) 
  Years of education  0.00100  0.00107  0.00103  -0.00885*  0.000626  0.000764  0.00103  -0.00799 
 
(0.00225)  (0.00226)  (0.00223)  (0.00522)  (0.00175)  (0.00175)  (0.00201)  (0.00741) 
Currently Pregnant  0.0533*  0.0545*  0.0649*  -0.105  0.0750***  0.0817***  0.0883***  -0.301** 
 
(0.0290)  (0.0297)  (0.0340)  (0.0834)  (0.0275)  (0.0296)  (0.0296)  (0.119) 
Income Q=2  -0.0423  -0.0438  -0.0507 
 
0.0190  0.0171  0.0210 
 
 
(0.0388)  (0.0378)  (0.0630) 
 
(0.0126)  (0.0128)  (0.0139) 
  Income Q=3  0.00695  0.00577  0.000966 
 
0.0417  0.0403  0.0332 
 
 
(0.0538)  (0.0530)  (0.0654) 
 
(0.0302)  (0.0297)  (0.0265) 
  Income Q=4  -0.0221  -0.0234  -0.0312 
 
-0.00791  -0.00877  -0.0247 
 
 
(0.0505)  (0.0499)  (0.0659) 
 
(0.0223)  (0.0226)  (0.0286) 
  Income Q=5  -0.0251  -0.0248  -0.0308 
 
-0.0510***  -0.0524***  -0.0648** 
 
 
(0.0521)  (0.0520)  (0.0681) 
 
(0.00874)  (0.00924)  (0.0283) 
  No of Children 6 years or older  0.00247  0.00185  0.00201 
 
0.00597*  0.00584*  0.00462 
 
 
(0.00432)  (0.00424)  (0.00366) 
 
(0.00343)  (0.00347)  (0.00305) 
  No of Children 5 years or younger  -0.00403  -0.00372  -0.00705 
 
0.00685  0.00713  0.00740 
 
 
(0.00878)  (0.00869)  (0.00950) 
 
(0.00521)  (0.00523)  (0.00662) 
  Region 2  -0.0286  -0.0304  -0.0291 
 
-0.0849***  -0.0838***  -0.141*** 
 
 
(0.0261)  (0.0264)  (0.0266) 
 
(0.0112)  (0.0113)  (0.0286) 
  Region 3  -0.0130  -0.0147  -0.0155 
 
-0.0577***  -0.0553***  -0.106*** 
 
 
(0.0260)  (0.0262)  (0.0264) 
 
(0.0120)  (0.0122)  (0.0293) 
  Region 4  0.00976  0.00801  0.00372 
 
-0.0549***  -0.0552***  -0.136*** 
 
 
(0.0313)  (0.0313)  (0.0294) 
 
(0.00724)  (0.00757)  (0.0293) 
  Region 5  0.0199  0.0181  0.0198 
 
-0.0416***  -0.0407***  -0.0894*** 
 
 
(0.0365)  (0.0366)  (0.0343) 
 
(0.0125)  (0.0130)  (0.0346) 
  Region 6  0.0370  0.0345  0.0306 
 
-0.0182  -0.0161  -0.0379 
 
 
(0.0342)  (0.0342)  (0.0295) 
 
(0.0219)  (0.0228)  (0.0518) 
  Region 7  0.0519*  0.0510*  0.0518** 
 
0.0100  0.0152  0.0304 
 
 
(0.0297)  (0.0297)  (0.0261) 
 
(0.0195)  (0.0205)  (0.0359) 
  Region 8  -0.00245  -0.00268  -0.00158 
 
-0.0405***  -0.0400***  -0.0937** 
 
 
(0.0293)  (0.0291)  (0.0277) 
 
(0.0117)  (0.0123)  (0.0425) 
  Region 9  0.115**  0.116**  0.120*** 
 
0.00996  0.0214  0.0352 
 
 
(0.0557)  (0.0546)  (0.0440) 
 
(0.0364)  (0.0425)  (0.0630) 
  Age at first marriage  0.00215  0.00224  0.00212  -0.0922***  0.000277  0.000337  0.000242  -0.0800* 
 
(0.00154)  (0.00155)  (0.00136)  (0.0347)  (0.00150)  (0.00153)  (0.00136)  (0.0441) 
Husband works  0.00766  0.00989  0.00758 
 
0.00319  0.00458  0.00672 
 
 
(0.0287)  (0.0285)  (0.0314) 
 
(0.0347)  (0.0350)  (0.0461) 
  Husband Age  0.000352  0.000367  5.96e-05 
 
-0.00116  -0.00118  -0.00103 
 
 
(0.00138)  (0.00138)  (0.00139) 
 
(0.000827)  (0.000846)  (0.000872) 
  Husband Education  -0.000398  -0.000376  -0.000280 
 
0.000355  0.000371  0.000426 
 
 
(0.000544)  (0.000543)  (0.000457) 
 
(0.000335)  (0.000347)  (0.000503) 
  Indigenous  0.00742  0.00797  0.00941 
 
0.00830  0.0109  0.0199 
 
 
(0.0173)  (0.0173)  (0.0167) 
 
(0.0138)  (0.0138)  (0.0204) 
  Poverty Level   6.21e-05  5.77e-05  -7.80e-06 
 
-0.000157  -0.000159  -0.000330 
 
 
(0.000439)  (0.000439)  (0.000439) 
 
(0.000524)  (0.000523)  (0.000640) 
  Violence  0.0269**  0.0487  0.0666* 
 
0.0173*  0.0446*  0.0484** 
 
 
(0.0118)  (0.0369)  (0.0342) 
 
(0.00995)  (0.0240)  (0.0230) 
  Reg. Violence 
     
2.845*** 
     
2.960*** 
       
(0.139) 
     
(0.0966) 
Intergenerational Violence 
     
0.263*** 
     
0.281*** 
       
(0.0547) 
     
(0.0552) 
Accepts Violence 
     
0.185** 
     
0.229*** 
       
(0.0720) 
     
(0.0758) 
Age at first Marriage^2 
     
0.00178** 
     
0.00168* 
       
(0.000758) 
     
(0.000984) 
Constant 
   
0.798***  -0.378 
   
0.478***  -0.703 
     
(0.160)  (0.384) 
   
(0.134)  (0.489) 
Exogeneity Test (chi2 k=1) 
 
0.39 ( p=0.534) 
     
1.33 (p= 0.249) 
    Observations  4,456  4,456  4,453  4,453  2,639  2,639  2,639  2,639 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
                *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.8.  Determinants of Job exit, Entire Sample and Different corrections. By Ethnicity 
                 
     
Treat-Selection 
   
Treat-Selection 
VARIABLES  Probit  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ  Probit  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ 
                  Age  -0.0144**  -0.0155***  -0.0271*** 
 
-0.0249***  -0.0249***  -0.0351*** 
 
 
(0.00561)  (0.00576)  (0.00867) 
 
(0.00581)  (0.00582)  (0.00705) 
  Age Squared  0.000130*  0.000144*  0.000307*** 
 
0.000269***  0.000270***  0.000418*** 
 
 
(7.76e-05)  (8.00e-05)  (0.000113) 
 
(8.70e-05)  (8.70e-05)  (9.89e-05) 
  Years of education  0.00147  0.00133  0.00207  -0.00502  0.000273  0.000383  0.000390  -0.0139** 
 
(0.00210)  (0.00210)  (0.00264)  (0.00831)  (0.00226)  (0.00225)  (0.00216)  (0.00600) 
Currently Pregnant  0.0530*  0.0577**  0.0686**  -0.337***  0.0669**  0.0679**  0.0765**  -0.0374 
 
(0.0279)  (0.0291)  (0.0345)  (0.105)  (0.0292)  (0.0296)  (0.0325)  (0.0924) 
Income Q=2  0.0199  0.0175  0.0192 
 
-0.0180  -0.0183  -0.0225 
 
 
(0.0169)  (0.0172)  (0.0145) 
 
(0.0225)  (0.0223)  (0.0269) 
  Income Q=3  0.0800**  0.0783**  0.0684*** 
 
4.86e-05  -0.000259  -0.00119 
 
 
(0.0312)  (0.0312)  (0.0236) 
 
(0.0287)  (0.0285)  (0.0316) 
  Income Q=4  0.0578*  0.0561  0.0430 
 
-0.0302  -0.0304  -0.0365 
 
 
(0.0348)  (0.0343)  (0.0268) 
 
(0.0287)  (0.0285)  (0.0343) 
  Income Q=5  0.0623  0.0585  0.0395 
 
-0.0339  -0.0329  -0.0374 
 
 
(0.0624)  (0.0619)  (0.0479) 
 
(0.0329)  (0.0334)  (0.0387) 
  No of Children 6 years or older  0.00591*  0.00562  0.00504* 
 
0.00479  0.00443  0.00368 
 
 
(0.00333)  (0.00343)  (0.00275) 
 
(0.00491)  (0.00488)  (0.00454) 
  No of Children 5 years or younger  0.00701  0.00738  0.00563 
 
-0.00568  -0.00549  -0.00918 
 
 
(0.00542)  (0.00547)  (0.00685) 
 
(0.0102)  (0.0102)  (0.0108) 
  Region 2  -0.0686***  -0.0683***  -0.0939*** 
 
-0.0577**  -0.0577**  -0.0586** 
 
 
(0.0151)  (0.0151)  (0.0298) 
 
(0.0235)  (0.0235)  (0.0276) 
  Region 3  -0.0476***  -0.0469***  -0.0763*** 
 
-0.0274  -0.0273  -0.0242 
 
 
(0.0144)  (0.0145)  (0.0296) 
 
(0.0255)  (0.0255)  (0.0285) 
  Region 4  -0.0513***  -0.0516***  -0.102*** 
 
-0.00897  -0.00915  -0.00858 
 
 
(0.00932)  (0.00969)  (0.0315) 
 
(0.0283)  (0.0283)  (0.0305) 
  Region 5  -0.0217  -0.0216  -0.0413 
 
-0.0398  -0.0400  -0.0376 
 
 
(0.0172)  (0.0175)  (0.0348) 
 
(0.0247)  (0.0248)  (0.0307) 
  Region 6  0.00929  0.0112  0.0271 
 
0.000457  0.000289  0.00203 
 
 
(0.0363)  (0.0367)  (0.0670) 
 
(0.0276)  (0.0275)  (0.0282) 
  Region 7  0.00130  0.00452  0.00785 
 
0.0302  0.0311  0.0385 
 
 
(0.0223)  (0.0232)  (0.0409) 
 
(0.0258)  (0.0257)  (0.0255) 
  Region 8  -0.0580***  -0.0586***  -0.125*** 
 
-0.0322  -0.0315  -0.0260 
 
 
(0.00795)  (0.00870)  (0.0374) 
 
(0.0231)  (0.0230)  (0.0274) 
  Region 9  -0.00851  -0.00172  0.0128 
 
0.0780*  0.0816*  0.0971** 
 
 
(0.0608)  (0.0705)  (0.121) 
 
(0.0452)  (0.0455)  (0.0398) 
  Age at first marriage  0.00120  0.00126  0.00110  -0.119***  0.00235  0.00244  0.00238  -0.0386 
 
(0.00147)  (0.00150)  (0.00135)  (0.0406)  (0.00186)  (0.00186)  (0.00165)  (0.0383) 
Husband works  0.0443***  0.0482***  0.0571*** 
 
-0.0171  -0.0169  -0.0179 
 
 
(0.0132)  (0.0128)  (0.0205) 
 
(0.0355)  (0.0354)  (0.0381) 
  Husband Age  4.16e-05  -3.93e-06  5.39e-05 
 
-0.000357  -0.000331  -0.000605 
 
 
(0.000966)  (0.000980)  (0.00107) 
 
(0.00130)  (0.00131)  (0.00127) 
  Husband Education  0.000130  0.000141  3.99e-05 
 
8.39e-05  0.000105  0.000182 
 
 
(0.000328)  (0.000336)  (0.000356) 
 
(0.000677)  (0.000672)  (0.000816) 
  Urban area  0.0227  0.0201  0.0241 
 
0.0311*  0.0307*  0.0333* 
 
 
(0.0165)  (0.0166)  (0.0171) 
 
(0.0169)  (0.0170)  (0.0200) 
  Poverty Level   0.000593  0.000565  0.000554 
 
-0.000121  -0.000110  -0.000191 
 
 
(0.000420)  (0.000424)  (0.000497) 
 
(0.000493)  (0.000493)  (0.000499) 
  Violence  0.00969  0.0405  0.0370 
 
0.0390***  0.0545  0.0778** 
 
 
(0.0102)  (0.0302)  (0.0278) 
 
(0.0121)  (0.0362)  (0.0339) 
  Reg. Violence 
     
2.987*** 
     
2.804*** 
       
(0.130) 
     
(0.136) 
Intergenerational Violence 
     
0.331*** 
     
0.213*** 
       
(0.0546) 
     
(0.0626) 
Accepts Violence 
     
0.209*** 
     
0.189*** 
       
(0.0772) 
     
(0.0675) 
Age at first Marriage^2 
     
0.00267*** 
     
0.000468 
       
(0.000878) 
     
(0.000857) 
Constant 
   
0.478***  -0.392 
   
0.748***  -0.795* 
     
(0.160)  (0.458) 
   
(0.139)  (0.419) 
Exogeneity Test (chi2 k=1) 
                Observations  2,946  2,946  2,944  2,944  4,149  4,149  4,148  4,148 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
                *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.9. Determinants of Job exit, IV and Selection correction, Indigenous people, by quintile of income  
 
Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4-Q5 








VARIABLES  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ 
                                      
Age  -0.0116  -0.0169 
 
-0.0108  -0.0195* 
 
-0.0372**  -0.0491** 
 
-0.0118  -0.0413* 
 
 
(0.00750)  (0.0108) 
 
(0.00739)  (0.0118) 
 
(0.0170)  (0.0221) 
 
(0.0128)  (0.0227) 
  Age Squared  0.000116  0.000194 
 
6.64e-05  0.000195 
 
0.000399*  0.000547* 
 
0.000128  0.000502* 
 
 
(0.000105)  (0.000145) 
 
(0.000103)  (0.000154) 
 
(0.000234)  (0.000280) 
 
(0.000180)  (0.000298) 
  Years of education  0.00649  0.00752  -0.00707  -0.000243  -0.000614  -0.0115  -0.000377  0.00147  -0.0208  0.00150  0.000350  0.0170 
 
(0.00408)  (0.00500)  (0.0207)  (0.00203)  (0.00293)  (0.0161)  (0.00504)  (0.00577)  (0.0177)  (0.00396)  (0.00496)  (0.0149) 
Currently Pregnant  0.0320  0.0419  -0.429**  0.0749  0.105*  -0.402**  0.0977  0.129  -0.150  -0.00991  -0.0168  0.146 
 
(0.0303)  (0.0376)  (0.184)  (0.0456)  (0.0593)  (0.178)  (0.104)  (0.132)  (0.299)  (0.0495)  (0.0764)  (0.278) 
No of Children 6 years or older  0.00813*  0.00550 
 
0.00610  0.00352 
 
0.0121  0.0145 
 
-0.0112  -0.00803 
 
 
(0.00490)  (0.00413) 
 
(0.00380)  (0.00373) 
 
(0.0135)  (0.0105) 
 
(0.00713)  (0.00555) 
  No of Children 5 years or younger  0.0108  0.00818 
 
0.0133*  0.0163 
 
0.00116  -0.00216 
 
-0.0218  -0.0281 
 
 
(0.00759)  (0.00821) 
 
(0.00706)  (0.0119) 
 
(0.0162)  (0.0199) 
 
(0.0188)  (0.0225) 
  Region 2  -0.0899***  -0.188*** 
 
-0.0392*  -0.0332 
 
-0.0872*  -0.117 
 
-0.0136  -0.0115 
 
 
(0.0191)  (0.0443) 
 
(0.0226)  (0.0294) 
 
(0.0522)  (0.0896) 
 
(0.0472)  (0.0649) 
  Region 3  -0.0614***  -0.138*** 
 
-0.00663  -0.00106 
 
-0.0995**  -0.147* 
 
-0.0519  -0.0576 
 
 
(0.0200)  (0.0469) 
 
(0.0221)  (0.0319) 
 
(0.0410)  (0.0894) 
 
(0.0397)  (0.0556) 




0.00483  0.0111 
 
-0.0889***  -0.148 
 
-0.0206  -0.0230 
 
   
(0.0444) 
 
(0.0297)  (0.0396) 
 
(0.0313)  (0.0906) 
 
(0.0563)  (0.0819) 
  Region 5  -0.0511***  -0.141*** 
 
0.0114  0.0313 
 
0.0579  0.0630 
 
-0.0391  -0.0398 
 
 
(0.0143)  (0.0530) 
 
(0.0308)  (0.0415) 
 
(0.0752)  (0.104) 
 
(0.0332)  (0.0660) 




0.224  0.344** 
 
0.0919  0.0827 
 
-0.0235  -0.0440 
 
   
(0.0682) 
 
(0.161)  (0.170) 
 
(0.121)  (0.138) 
 
(0.0348)  (0.0654) 
  Region 7  -0.00978  -0.0403 
 
0.128  0.199** 
 
-0.0581  -0.112 
 
0.0116  0.0303 
 
 
(0.0239)  (0.0677) 
 
(0.0880)  (0.0834) 
 
(0.0448)  (0.0991) 
 
(0.0486)  (0.0695) 
  Region 8 
 
-0.199*** 
   
-0.0238 
   
-0.222** 
 
-0.0459  -0.0145 
 
   
(0.0509) 
   
(0.0435) 
   
(0.104) 
 
(0.0312)  (0.0811) 
  Region 9 
 
-0.135** 
   
-0.106 
 
0.183  0.242 
   
0.0103 
 
   
(0.0560) 
   
(0.0824) 
 
(0.361)  (0.323) 
   
(0.0701) 
  Age at first marriage  0.00159  0.00125  -0.161**  0.00207  0.00154  -0.0455  0.00995**  0.00881*  0.0315  -0.00468  -0.00249  -0.335*** 
 





0.0225  0.0280 
 
0.0664  0.0393 
   
0.118*** 
 
   
(0.0542) 
 
(0.0187)  (0.0375) 
 
(0.0466)  (0.0753) 
   
(0.0436) 
  Husband Age  -0.000168  0.000474 
 
0.00171  0.00206 
 
-0.00145  0.000529 
 
-0.00174  -0.00206 
 
 
(0.000965)  (0.00107) 
 
(0.00129)  (0.00188) 
 
(0.00302)  (0.00315) 
 
(0.00238)  (0.00227) 
  Husband Education  0.000297  0.000309 
 
0.000524  0.000813 
 
-6.19e-05  0.000102 
 
-0.00151**  -0.000906** 
 
 
(0.000364)  (0.000597) 
 
(0.000416)  (0.000775) 
 
(0.00109)  (0.000786) 
 
(0.000633)  (0.000366) 




-0.00215  -0.00927 
 
0.0266  0.0305 
 
0.0608***  0.0524** 
 
   
(0.0286) 
 
(0.0157)  (0.0227) 
 
(0.0352)  (0.0330) 
 
(0.0195)  (0.0260) 
  Poverty Level   0.00133  0.00124 
 
0.000286  0.000393 
 
0.000542  0.000429 
 
-0.000990  -0.000875 
 
 
(0.00108)  (0.00103) 
 
(0.000581)  (0.000821) 
 
(0.000851)  (0.000755) 
   
(0.000861) 
  Violence  0.00382  0.0213 
 
0.0358  0.0235 
 
0.0771  0.0223 
 
0.0586  0.102 
 
 
(0.0326)  (0.0273) 
 
(0.0285)  (0.0492) 
 
(0.0992)  (0.0890) 
 
(0.0873)  (0.112) 
  Income Q=4 
                 
0.0114  0.00277 
 
                   
(0.0341)  (0.0441) 
  Reg. Violence 
   
3.068*** 
   
3.165*** 
   
2.898*** 
   
2.616*** 
     
(0.194) 
   
(0.311) 
   
(0.362) 
   
(0.408) 
Intergenerational Violence 
   
0.203** 
   
0.527*** 
   
0.411*** 
   
0.166 
     
(0.0959) 
   
(0.120) 
   
(0.124) 
   
(0.150) 
Accepts Violence 
   
0.186* 
   
0.254* 
   
0.229 
   
0.184 
     
(0.112) 
   
(0.150) 
   
(0.176) 
   
(0.158) 
Age at first Marriage^2 
   
0.00372** 
   
0.00120 
   
-0.000650 
   
0.00664*** 
     
(0.00170) 
   
(0.00163) 
   
(0.00263) 




0.227  -0.0220 
 
0.273  -1.288 
 
0.865**  -1.982 
 
0.928**  2.497** 
   
(0.204)  (0.854) 
 
(0.193)  (0.878) 
 
(0.411)  (1.275) 
 
(0.472)  (1.017) 
athrho 
   
-0.0818 
   
0.00280 
   
-0.129 
   
-0.103 
     
(0.0897) 
   
(0.143) 
   
(0.172) 
   
(0.235) 
lnsigma 
   
-1.482*** 
   
-1.461*** 
   
-1.155*** 
   
-1.254*** 
     
(0.0882) 
   
(0.0651) 
   
(0.0539) 
   
(0.0763) 
Observations  717  831  831  816  820  820  648  651  651  628  642  642 
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VARIABLES  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ  IV Probit  LPM  Selec EQ 
                                      
Age  -0.0176*  -0.0239** 
 
-0.0456***  -0.0597*** 
 
-0.0303***  -0.0377*** 
 
-0.0198*  -0.0321* 
 
 
(0.00937)  (0.0121) 
 
(0.0151)  (0.0178) 
 
(0.0113)  (0.0126) 
 
(0.0105)  (0.0168) 
  Age Squared  0.000280**  0.000364** 
 
0.000521**  0.000728** 
 
0.000327*  0.000431** 
 
0.000168  0.000340 
 
 
(0.000133)  (0.000164) 
 
(0.000255)  (0.000288) 
 
(0.000167)  (0.000177) 
 
(0.000141)  (0.000219) 
  Years of education  0.00403  0.00362  -0.0234  -0.00149  -0.00106  0.00161  -0.000245  -0.000345  -0.0112  0.000520  -0.000268  -0.000988 
 
(0.00330)  (0.00358)  (0.0154)  (0.00389)  (0.00375)  (0.0160)  (0.00339)  (0.00335)  (0.0135)  (0.00424)  (0.00458)  (0.0145) 
Currently Pregnant  0.188***  0.168***  0.0419  0.0461  0.0508  0.0879  -0.0141  -0.00841  0.0912  0.0794  0.0899  -0.443** 
 
(0.0552)  (0.0536)  (0.189)  (0.0606)  (0.0690)  (0.229)  (0.0403)  (0.0538)  (0.236)  (0.0582)  (0.0627)  (0.195) 
No of Children 6 years or older  -0.00530  -0.00529 
 
0.00981  0.00865 
 
0.000499  0.00140 
 
0.0133  0.0110 
 
 
(0.00739)  (0.00792) 
 
(0.0114)  (0.00933) 
 
(0.00943)  (0.00741) 
 
(0.00958)  (0.0104) 
  No of Children 5 years or younger  0.00771  0.00632 
 
-0.0412*  -0.0412* 
 
-0.00755  -0.00957 
 
0.00327  0.000881 
 
 
(0.0116)  (0.0139) 
 
(0.0229)  (0.0224) 
 
(0.0219)  (0.0228) 
 
(0.0163)  (0.0199) 
  Region 2  -0.143***  -0.212*** 
 
-0.0324  -0.0271 
 
0.00471  -0.000627 
 
-0.0109  -0.0185 
 
 
(0.0233)  (0.0610) 
 
(0.0774)  (0.0759) 
 
(0.0574)  (0.0451) 
 
(0.0363)  (0.0348) 
  Region 3  -0.0790***  -0.0997 
 
0.000246  0.00540 
 
0.0729  0.0526 
 
0.00596  -0.000347 
 
 
(0.0259)  (0.0963) 
 
(0.0817)  (0.0785) 
 
(0.0746)  (0.0502) 
 
(0.0421)  (0.0369) 
  Region 4  -0.0900***  -0.158** 
 
0.0582  0.0535 
 
0.0739  0.0574 
 
-0.0102  -0.0136 
 
 
(0.0180)  (0.0684) 
 
(0.0927)  (0.0717) 
 
(0.0824)  (0.0562) 
 
(0.0488)  (0.0441) 
  Region 5  -0.0966***  -0.220*** 
 
0.0159  0.0290 
 
0.00760  0.0154 
 
-0.0270  -0.0187 
 
 
(0.0172)  (0.0821) 
 
(0.0822)  (0.0731) 
 
(0.0590)  (0.0452) 
 
(0.0380)  (0.0361) 
  Region 6  -0.0764***  -0.123* 
 
0.0274  0.0270 
 
0.139  0.109** 
 
0.00866  0.000223 
 
 
(0.0282)  (0.0678) 
 
(0.0882)  (0.0763) 
 
(0.0850)  (0.0517) 
 
(0.0386)  (0.0337) 
  Region 7  -0.0203  -0.0143 
 
0.00550  0.0128 
 
0.112*  0.101** 
 
0.0897**  0.0839** 
 
 
(0.0396)  (0.0623) 
 
(0.0720)  (0.0629) 
 
(0.0611)  (0.0451) 
 
(0.0435)  (0.0349) 
  Region 8  -0.0623**  -0.0861 
 
-0.0568  -0.0627 
 
0.00897  0.0158 
 
-0.0320  -0.0293 
 
 
(0.0309)  (0.0689) 
 
(0.0584)  (0.0658) 
 
(0.0601)  (0.0440) 
 
(0.0327)  (0.0360) 
  Region 9  0.0319  0.0675 
 
0.0302  0.0408 
 
0.133  0.107 
 
0.149  0.132 
 
 
(0.0695)  (0.0911) 
 
(0.100)  (0.0799) 
 
(0.115)  (0.0795) 
 
(0.118)  (0.0981) 
  Age at first marriage  0.00108  0.00214  0.0311  0.00374  0.00375  0.0269  0.0103***  0.00947**  -0.0157  -0.00324  -0.00286  -0.153** 
 
(0.00328)  (0.00345)  (0.0765)  (0.00507)  (0.00478)  (0.103)  (0.00391)  (0.00409)  (0.0953)  (0.00223)  (0.00191)  (0.0744) 
Husband works  0.00307  0.0260 
 
0.0237  0.0329 
 
0.0353  0.0336 
 
-0.0735  -0.0744 
 
 
(0.0872)  (0.112) 
 
(0.0759)  (0.0796) 
 
(0.0469)  (0.0617) 
 
(0.0620)  (0.0667) 
  Husband Age  -0.00315*  -0.00354** 
 
-0.00104  -0.00108 
 
0.00104  0.00127 
 
0.00125  0.00112 
 
 
(0.00179)  (0.00178) 
 
(0.00395)  (0.00393) 
 
(0.00230)  (0.00255) 
 
(0.00158)  (0.00168) 
  Husband Education  -0.000602  -0.000686 
 
-0.000443  -0.000191 
 
0.00134  0.00166 
 
-0.000220  -0.000246 
 
 
(0.000787)  (0.000698) 
 
(0.00147)  (0.00155) 
 
(0.00128)  (0.00196) 
 
(0.00159)  (0.00180) 
  Urban area  -0.00698  -0.00422 
 
0.0401  0.0338 
 
0.0421  0.0497 
 
0.0831***  0.122*** 
 
 
(0.0242)  (0.0277) 
 
(0.0360)  (0.0337) 
 
(0.0344)  (0.0431) 
 
(0.0115)  (0.0373) 
  Poverty Level   -0.00190*  -0.00250* 
 
-0.000752  -0.000706 
 
0.00105  0.000937 
 
0.000864  0.000458 
 
 
(0.00104)  (0.00141) 
 
(0.00120)  (0.00115) 
 
(0.000915)  (0.000951) 
 
(0.000851)  (0.000902) 
  Violence  0.136***  0.169*** 
 
0.0978  0.161** 
 
0.0811  0.0560 
 
-0.0326  -0.0188 
 
 
(0.0473)  (0.0554) 
 
(0.0937)  (0.0797) 
 
(0.0599)  (0.0619) 
 
(0.0533)  (0.0806) 
  Income Q=4  0.00199  0.000269 
                   
 
(0.0214)  (0.0272) 
                    Reg. Violence 
   
2.494*** 
   
3.087*** 
   
3.160*** 
   
2.561*** 
     
(0.268) 
   
(0.344) 
   
(0.319) 
   
(0.208) 
Intergenerational Violence 
   
0.0460 
   
0.251** 
   
0.239** 
   
0.269*** 
     
(0.117) 
   
(0.125) 
   
(0.114) 
   
(0.0917) 
Accepts Violence 
   
0.167 
   
0.236 
   
0.183 
   
0.126 
     
(0.120) 
   
(0.145) 
   
(0.178) 
   
(0.156) 
Age at first Marriage^2 
   
-0.00106 
   
-0.000602 
   
-0.000227 
   
0.00287* 
     
(0.00183) 
   
(0.00238) 
   
(0.00213) 




0.712***  -1.167 
 
1.126***  -1.935* 
 
0.392  -1.216 
 
0.706**  0.428 
   
(0.235)  (0.831) 
 
(0.353)  (1.063) 
 
(0.267)  (1.037) 
 
(0.355)  (0.830) 
athrho 
   
-0.134 
   
-0.189 
   
-0.0883 
   
0.0543 
     
(0.109) 
   
(0.130) 
   
(0.110) 
   
(0.174) 
lnsigma 
   
-1.132*** 
   
-1.019*** 
   
-1.115*** 
   
-1.206*** 
     
(0.0404) 
   
(0.0508) 
   
(0.0379) 
   
(0.0432) 
Observations  934  934  934  869  869  869  1,125  1,125  1,125  1,221  1,220  1,220 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
                        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                       